University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2009

Pre-Closing Liability
Omri Ben-Shahar
dangelolawlib+omribenshahar@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Omri Ben-Shahar, "Pre-Closing Liability" (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No.
498, 2009).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 498
(2D SERIES)

Pre‐Closing Liability
Omri Ben‐Shahar

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
November 2009
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

PRECLOSING LIABILITY
Omri Ben‐Shahar*

University of Chicago Law School
Chicago, IL 60637

Prepared for
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Special issue on
The Jurisprudence of Judge Frank H. Easterbrook

Abstract
Two years after Penzoil v. Texaco threatened to burst the seam of
contract formation and find binding commitments before negotiations
ended, Judge Easterbrook stitched the rupture. His landmark decision in
Empro v. Ball Co. held that a letter‐of‐intent, which is subject to the
preparation of a more comprehensive formal document, is not binding.
Each party can freely walk away from it prior to the closing, without
incurring any liability and without the court scrutinizing the reasons for
the negotiations breakdown. Many courts have since cited and followed
Judge Easterbrook’s approach. In this commentary, I argue that that this
freedom to walk away from negotiations is too broad and in conflict
with the ex ante interests of the parties. Intermediate liability at the
pre‐closing stage would induce more efficient levels of precontractual
reliance, benefitting both parties. I develop one possible foundation for
an intermediate liability regime and demonstrate how it would apply in
the case.

*

I am grateful to Eric Posner for helpful comments.

I. Empro v. Ball Co. and the Problem of Precontractual Liability
A. Preface
Writing about Judge Easterbrook’s impact on contract law without commenting on
his decisions in ProCD v. Zeidenberg and Hill v. Gateway is like ordering a Big Mac
without the two beef patties. Where is the beef? These two cases are probably the
most important and influential contract law decisions of our era.1 They reshaped the
doctrine of mutual assent and received a tsunami of scholarly attention. Four major
legislation efforts in the national scale—so far unsuccessful—were triggered by the
desire to reverse the holdings in these decisions, and in the judicial following they
garnered.2
Despite the temptation, I chose not to remark on these branches of Easterbrook’s
jurisprudence. They have been dissected in a host of articles, courts decisions, and
symposia. Contracts doctrinalists largely hate these decisions—it has become
almost an instinct among contracts commentators to collectively condemn these
decisions—whereas some law and economics writers support the decisions.3 Since
my views here will contribute nothing new, I can at best recommend my favorite
commentaries on these cases.4 Instead, I am electing to turn my attention to another
of Easterbrook’s resounding influences: the problem of precontractual liability.

ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147
(7th Cir. 1997).
2 Attempts to override or codify these decisions were at core of several legislative
initiatives, including the UCITA, Article 2B of the UCC, the Revision to Article 2 of the UCC,
and the currently ALI’s Principles of the Law of Software Contracting. See, e.g., James J.
White, Contracting Under Amended Article 2‐207, 2004 Wisc. L. Rev. 723, 737‐742; Amrican
Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Software Contracting, Tentative Draft (2007)…
3 See, e.g., my colleague Eric Posner’s contribution to this symposium, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: A
Reconsideration, which highligts some of the strengths of the decisions.
4 For an excellent review of the scholarly debate that ProCD triggered, as well as a
fascinating empirical perspective on the problem, see, Florencia Marotta‐Wurgler, Are Pay
Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software Licensing
Agreements, 38 J. Legal Stud. 309, 313‐17 (2009). On ProCD and assent doctrine, see Richard
Epstein, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Do Doctrine and Function Mix?, in CONTRACTS STORIES 94 (D.
1
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Writing not long after Texaco v. Penzoil, the case that stunned the business
community and threatened to burst the seam of contract formation and to find
binding commitments before negotiations ended,5 Judge Easterbrook stitched the
rupture. His decision in Empro v. Ball Co. has become a staple in the law of “pre‐
closing” contractual liability.6 It has been featured in first year contracts casebooks
as the ultimate statement why there is no liability before the closing.7
B. The Problem
Empro v. Ball Co. is a simple case, almost generic: two firms negotiate a deal, reach
some substantial understanding over the terms, memorialize them in a document
titled “letter of intent” or “agreement in principle,” condition it on board approval,
and also agree to iron out the remaining details and finalize the deal in a more
formal contract. Subsequently, the negotiations collapse, or one party walks away,
and the formal document is never finalized. Is the signed memorandum—the
preliminary agreement—binding? Is it a contract? Or can either party freely walk
away from it?
As common as this dispute is, there is no simple legal resolution to it. Sometimes
these preliminary documents are intended to be binding, other times they are not.
There are various factors in the surrounding circumstances that can help courts
identify the parties’ intent: the language of commitment that the parties used (e.g.,
“non‐binding agreement”); the importance of the missing terms (e.g., price); conduct
indicating that the parties believed they had a commitment (e.g., reliance by both
parties); and the like.8 Some courts are willing sort through the facts of the dispute

Baird, Ed., 2007). On ProCD and copyright law, see Guy A. Rub, Contracting Around
Copyright: The Uneasy Case of Unbundling of Rights in Creative Works (Mimeo, 2009).
5 Texaco v. Penzoil, 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1987).
6 Empro Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Ball‐Co Manufacturing Co., Inc., 870 F.2d 423 (7th Cir.,
1989).
7 See, e.g., DAWSON, HARVEY, HENDERSON, BAIRD, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 380 (9th Ed.,
2008); BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 306 (3rd Ed., 2003); MURPHY, SPEIDEL, AYRES,
STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 427 (6th Ed. 2003); FRIER, WHITE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS
147 (2nd Ed. 2005); SUMMERS, HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION 502 (4th Ed. 2001).
8 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §27.
3

to figure out what the parties intended. Other courts prefer to simplify adjudication
by relying only on formalized agreements and inducing parties to avoid such
disputes and be clearer when they memorialize their understandings.
Interestingly, this is an area of contract law that proved trickier to regulate than
other areas of contract interpretation. The law requires courts to reach a yes/no
decision, all‐or‐nothing, contract versus no‐contract, freedom‐to‐walk‐away versus
full‐expectation‐damages, whereas the situation is fundamentally one of
intermediate, half way, assent. On the one hand, it is clear that some substantial
consensus has been reached between the parties and that the preliminary
agreement is a milestone in reaching assent, and thus allowing the parties to freely
walk away would frustrate their initial accomplishment. On the other hand, the
parties have also made it clear that additional agreement needs to be reached and
some conditions need to be met for there to be a “contract,” and thus enforcing their
precontractual understanding as if it were a contract (and filling its gaps with
majoritarian terms) would deprive each party of the power it sought to maintain, to
reject unfavorable additional terms.
It is not surprising, then, that case law is replete with incoherent guidance. In one
classic case, the court concluded that prior precedents in this area are “in hopeless
conflict.”9 Leading luminaries characterized case law as “confusing”, “inconsistent”,
“all over the board”, and the “least predictable” in the entire area of contract law.10
It is also not surprising, when ambiguity reigns, that a Judge Easterbrook decision
Walker v. Keith, 382 S.W. 2d 198, 199 (Ky. 1964).
See See, e.g., Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 217, at 255‐263 (1987) (“it would be
difficult to find a less predictable area of contract law”); Karl Llewellyn, On Our CaseLaw of
Contract: Offer and Acceptance (pt. 1), 48 Yale L.J. 1, 13 (1938) (rules governing preliminary
agreements “are utterly devoid of … meaning” when applied to the facts); Buechler, The
Recognition of Preliminary Agreements in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions: An Empirical
Analysis of the Disagreement Process, 22 Creighton L. Rev. 573, 574 (“the decisions in this
area continue to appear both confusing and inconsistent to the point where it is said to be
virtually impossible to predict the outcome in a particular case.”) Temkin, When Does the
Fat Lady Sing? An Analysis of “Agreements in Principle” in Corporate Acquisitions, 55
Fordham L. Rev. 125, 131 (1986) (decision have come out “all over the board”).
9

10
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would surface with a clear position. It is a typical Easterbrook decision: short,
forceful, persuasive, lights out. Nevertheless, I will argue that the policy it articulates
is socially undesirable.
C. Easterbrook’s Solution
The agreement in Empro v. Ball Co. was a three‐page letter of intent titled “General
Terms and Conditions,” for the sale of a manufacturing company. The price and the
payment terms were agreed upon. The agreement named some issues that needed
to be resolved: a non‐compete provision, warranties, a consulting arrangement for
the sellers, and “the definitive terms and conditions of this transaction.” The
agreement was conditioned on approval by the board of directors of the buyer. The
crucial term was the “subject to” clause, stating that the agreement “will be subject
to and incorporated in a formal, definitive Asset Purchase Agreement signed by both
parties”. After several months of further negotiations, and before a final formal
agreement was reached, the seller walked away from the deal, to negotiate instead
with a third party. The suit was by the buyer to enforce the letter of intent.
Judge Easterbrook dismissed it. The letter of intent was not binding, he concluded,
because the parties intended not to be bound until the formal definitive contract
was executed. Their use of the “subject to” language (twice), without otherwise
indicating that their commitment is immediate, reinforces the position that the
agreement was not binding until formalized. The board approval escape hatch
further demonstrates that the buyer wanted to preserve the right to walk, and did
not intend to be bound till later. The buyer also secured the right to get the earnest
money back, refusing to commit to even a small measure of precontractual liability.
Finally, Easterbrook points out that when the seller accepted the letter of intent, it
stated that “some clarifications” would be needed. In Easterbrook’s words,
“‘Some clarifications are needed’ is an ominous noise in a negotiation,
foreboding many a stalemate. Although we do not know what
‘clarifications’ counsel had in mind, the specifics are not important. It
is enough that even on signing the letter of intent [seller] proposed to
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change the bargain, conduct consistent with the purport of the letter’s
text and structure.”11
Thus, the combination of the subject to wording, the board approval conditions, and
the clarifications needed statement indicate that no contract was entered and the
parties were free to walk away.
Easterbrook also dismisses the buyer’s more modest claim, to at least recover its
reliance expenditures—those costs the buyer sunk in reliance on the letter of intent,
including the cost of negotiating with the seller, investigating the seller’s business
and preparing the acquisition. If there is not contract, there is no liability, however
measured:
“Outlays of this sort cannot bind the other side any more than paying
an expert to tell you whether the painting at the auction is a genuine
Rembrandt compels the auctioneer to accept your bid.”12
Easterbrook is clear about the rationale for his decision. Approaching agreement in
stages is “a valuable method of doing business.”13 Early in the negotiations parties
do not yet know if they will succeed or fail. It is their interest to reach
understandings without fear that they will be forced into an agreement that they do
not want, one that includes terms to which they did not agree. As Easterbrook
explained in a later case with similar facts,
“If any sign of agreement on any issue exposed the parties to a risk
that a judge would deem the first‐resolved items to be stand‐alone
contracts, The process of negotiation would be more cumbersome
(the parties would have to hedge every sentence with cautionary
legalese) and these extra negotiating costs would raise the effective
price.”14
II. An Alternative Solution: Intermediate Liability
Easterbrook’s no liability solution is sensible when contrasted with the opposite
solution of full contractual liability. The parties’ representations suggested that they
expected some more negotiations and were not yet ready to call it a deal. Having to
choose between two polar alternatives, Easterbrook shows us that the full
870 F. 2d, at 426
Id.
13 Id.
14 PFT Roberson, Inc. v. Volvo Trucks N.A., Inc., 420 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2005).
11
12
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contractual liability solution is too aggressive and thus the zero liability outcome is
inevitable.
The problem with this methodology is that it unnecessarily narrows down the set of
possible solutions to two. Between the two polar outcomes of zero liability and full
liability lies a whole continuum of intermediate solutions. Since we are dealing with
a situation of partial assent, wouldn’t it be more appropriate to attach legal
consequences that reflect this intermediacy—that assign liability somewhere in the
interval between zero and full contractual liability? I will argue that such an
intermediate measure of liability exists, flexible enough to correspond to the
intermediate degree of assent reached between the parties, and that it dominates
the two polar liability regimes. The first step is to explain why an intermediate
liability rule is desirable; I will then introduce a specific intermediate precontractual
liability rule; finally I will apply it to the pre‐closing scenario of Empro.
A. Normative Grounds for an Intermediate Liability Regime
In complex deals, as Judge Easterbrook acknowledges, it is technically impossible to
tackle all issues simultaneously. Consensus is achieved piecemeal; one by one issues
are resolved. Usually, when enough such resolutions are amassed, the parties then
decide that some memorialization of the agreed upon terms is useful, and that a
structured plan for the remainder of negotiations is desirable. This milestone is not
the end, but rather a stage toward a more complete agreement, which is sometimes
specifically referred to in the preliminary understanding.
What is the value of this pre‐closing memorialization? Surely, the act of signing a
letter of intent is more than a secreterial archiving of items. One possibility is that by
taking stock of what is already agreed upon and recognizing the mass of
accomplishment, the parties create some inertia for the remainder of the
negotiations. The parties may believe that the incentive to overcome the remaining
issues may increase after most of the agreement is recorded, or that the remainder
can be delegated to agents (lawyers), or that some more information is needed to
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nail down the final issues, or that some of the issues that remain open could be
sidestepped, if the likelihood of some contingencies decline.
It is often recommended in negotiation manuals that the harder issues should be
avoided early on in the negotiation as they might “place an unbearable strain on
overall settlement process”.15 The psychological basis for this paradigm is a
“momentum” notion: if the parties tackle easier issues first and build as much
understanding as possible, they increase their own motivation and incentive to find
ways to resolve the contentious issues.16 The effort already spent on achieving
partial agreement and the dynamic of good will that this effort generated accord a
more amenable context for the resolution of the remaining issues.17 The recording
of the preliminary understanding, under this view, helps marshal the parties’ good
will and motivation to continue.
The economic basis for this momentum paradigm could be an incomplete
information account: as issues get resolved, the parties update their beliefs about
the expected surplus from the deal. And each party also knows that the other party
is performing the same updating. There can be a strategic factor here: each party
may believe that by formalizing early understandings, the counterparty becomes
more eager to finalize the deal, which would make it possible extract greater further
concessions from that party.18
It is one thing to record and memorialize the preliminary agreement. It is another
thing to be committed to it. Can the parties be committed only to what they agreed?
15 David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator 97 (1986) (parties should
avoid contentious issues that “may render agreement impossible”).
16 This notion is familiar in international negotiations. See Geoffrey R. Watson, THE OSLO
ACCORDS __ (2000) (“One puzzle‐solving heuristic is to solve the easy part of the puzzle first;
once that part is solved, the harder parts of the puzzle may seem easier.”); Fred Charles Iklé,
HOW NATIONS NEGOTIATE 1, 18 (1987) (“If there is a conflict about many issues, the less
controversial ones should be solved first because agreement will lead to further
agreement”).
17 Id., at 222; Robert Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet, and Andrew S Tulumello, Beyond Winning:
Negotiating to Create Value in Deals and Disputes 251 (2000).
18 See, e.g., Lax and Sebenius, supra note 15, at 96‐97 (“Negotiations often leave much
ambiguity with the tacit understanding that a definite resolution of the issue perhaps
strongly favoring one party will later become necessary”)
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Why would such gradual commitment, coupled with intermediate magnitude of
liability, be advantageous in these environments of negotiations‐in‐stages? One type
of benefit, often mentioned in the negotiation literature, is the cognitive effect
associated with a gradual compromise. Concessions that may be hard to make if
framed as a lumpy, all‐at‐once departure from one’s ideal terms, may be easier to
digest in a series of small slivers.19 Partial commitments effectively carve up of the
otherwise hard‐to‐swallow large commitment. This is the same logic soon‐to‐be‐
married couples invoke in making gradual premarital commitments (e.g., buying
shared assets, moving into a shared residence, opening joint accounts). If it were
completely costless, in terms of non‐legal repercussions, to walk away anytime prior
to the full formal agreement, these milestones would have less value, and, short of
self‐deception, they would not help the parties make a gradual assent towards
cohabitation. A norm (or legal rule) of unrestricted freedom to retract, to reopen
resolved issues, and to break the negotiations for any reason, would undermine the
gradual compromise idea. 20
Another benefit of an intermediate commitment arising from precontractual
understandings is associated with the “integrity” of negotiations. If parties are free
to walk away anytime prior to the full blown contract, the negotiation arena will be
appealing to individuals who are not “serious” and are not truly interested in
dealing. The value of such a surrounding to the serious traders would then diminish.
The signal that entrance to negotiations transmits with respect to the propensity of

See, e.g., Robert C. Cialdini, Influence 27 (1984) (“The trick is to bring up the extra
[expenses] independently of one another so that each small price will seem petty when
compared to the already‐determined much larger one.”)
20 Lax and Sebenius, supra note 15, at 279‐280 (Emphasizing the informal sanctions of
breaking contingent agreements); Roy J. Lewicki, et al., Negotiations 100 (2d Ed. 1994)
(Advocating that negotiators strategically make only tentative commitments until an entire
agreement is reached).
19
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a party to work towards a deal is more powerful the greater is the sanction for
walking away.21 This is a standard—and desirable—sorting mechanism.
Still, it might be conjectured that this is too crude a sorting device, that it will deter
parties who are potentially serious but not ready to assume some liability. Namely,
even a partial precontractual commitment—any limitation of the freedom from
contract—might “chill” the incentives to bargain, reducing the incidence of surplus
creating negotiations, and thus reducing, rather than enhancing, the parties’
payoffs.22 In Judge Easterbrook’s words, parties would fear that “they have
bargained away their privilege to disagree on the specifics,” which would
undermine their incentive to enter precontractual understandings.23
This intuitive conjecture is misguided. If there is a chilling effect caused by some
measure of precontractual liability, it is disproportionately weighty on non‐serious
parties—those who are less likely to enter the contract and are thus more likely to
be subject to the precontractual liability rule. This disproportionate burden on the
non‐serious parties would deter their entry. The more serious parties would find
the liability regime desirable. For one, it would deter and filter out wasteful
negotiations. Moreover, it would induce more efficient reliance investments.24 As
recognized in a court decision to which Judge Easterbrook concurred, “the parties
may want assurance that their investments in time and money and effort will not be
wiped out by the other party's footdragging or change of heart or taking advantage
This “signaling” effect is recognized in the international negotiations literature. See, e.g.,
Lloyd Jensen, SovietAmerican Behavior in Disarmament Negotiations, in I.W. Zartman (ed.),
THE 50% SOLUTION (Anchor Book 1976), at 289.
22 See 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 361 (2d. Ed. 1998) ( “a chilling effect” of discouraging
parties from entering negotiations); Jason S. Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap
Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 385, 416‐417, 445‐446
(1999) (precontractual liability would “cause the market to shrink” and would force parties
to utilize more cautious bargaining strategies, wasting opportunities for efficient trade).
23 870 F. 2d at 426.
24 The argument that liability can enhance precontractual reliance appears in Avery W. Katz,
When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary
Negotiations, 105 Yale L.J. 1249 (1996); Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient
Reliance, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 481 (1996). A formal analysis of the particular rules of liability that
can induce efficient reliance is Lucian A. Bebchuk and Omri Ben‐Shahar, Precontractual
Reliance, 30 J. Leg. Stud. 423 (2001).
21
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of a vulnerable position created by the negotiation.”25 Such precontractual
investments take many forms. Parties forgo opportunities to negotiate with other
partners; give up offers and promotions; invest in relationship specific training and
assets;26 acquire information; build capacity; and so forth. These investments
increase the value that the potential deal would subsequently divide.
In the absence of some kind of commitment from the counterparty and liability to
back it up, each party would fear that these investments are more likely to be
wasted or expropriated. Without liability, it is more likely the other party will turn
around and walk away. And even if the other party stays, greater reliance
investment would make the investing party more vulnerable to hold‐up. Thus, if
negotiations lead to a contract, the benefits a party can enjoy from its own reliance
investments are diminished by ability of the other party to expropriate some of the
surplus they create. Since the other party can threaten to walk away, it can reopen
negotiations and re‐split the post‐investment surplus. This hold up problem would
reduce the incentive to invest. From a social perspective, the reduced levels of
precontractual reliance that result are inefficient in two different ways: Deals that
do get formed generate a lower surplus, and some efficient deals that could have
been formed are never entered into.27
According to this view, parties who enter into preliminary agreements without
expressly stipulating the liability consequences, have in mind a commitment that is
neither full contract nor zero liability, but rather carries some binding force. They
want to accord each other some measure of security, thereby encourage each other
to keep investing in the success of the relationship, and to screen out, ex ante,
frivolous partners. Each party must sacrifice some of its own freedom to walk away
in order to encourage the other party to take the chance. The benefit from higher

Venture Associates v. Zenith Data Systems Corp., 96 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir., 1996).
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
27 See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Omri Ben‐Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. Leg. Stud. 423
(2001); Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 481
(1996); and Avery W. Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory
Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 Yale L.J. 1249 (1996).
25
26
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overall investment, which would materialize if a contract eventually forms, more
than offsets the cost of restricting the freedom to walk away.
B. A Specific Intermediate Liability Rule
Any precontractual liability rule has to answer two questions: (1) when is a party
liable for breaking off negotiations; and (2) what are the legal remedies available to
the disappointed party. As we shall see, part (2) is easier to answer. It is part (1)—
the grounds for liability—that is more difficult to answer. Surely, not every incident
of negotiation termination should lead to liability. Most negotiations simply fail, or
go stale, or are terminated by one party for good reason, having given the
negotiations a good honest chance. Thus, much of the thinking about precontractual
liability, and most of the legal innovations in the field, identify some conception of
fault as the basis for inflicting liability on a party who abandons negotiations or
refuses to follow through on an agreement in principle. The party who is more at
fault has to compensate the party who is less at fault, at least for the latter’s reliance
costs.
The problem, of course, is to identify what would constitute faulty refusal to
negotiate. Fluid conceptions like “bad faith” and culpa in contrahendo merely restate
the problem or provide labels in Latin for the solutions, but do not advance the ball.
Instead, they often lead to the type of skepticism that Judge Easterbrook rightly
voices, that vagueness would bread excessive precontractual regulation and would
merely introduce anxiety to the negotiations. What is needed is a compact
conception of what it is that should be regarded as bad faith—which subset of
negotiation breakdowns is socially undesirable.
This question cannot be answered without first articulating what exactly is the
benefit the liability is trying to generate. In the discussion above I mentioned several
potential benefits to precontractual liability—inducing reliance investments,
protecting the integrity of the negotiation arena, making agreement easier to
accomplish, and more. Each of these objectives might justify a different liability rule.
It will be overly ambitious to claim that all these goals can be optimally addressed
12

by the same rule. Thus, in the discussion here, I will focus on one objective: optimal
pre‐closing reliance.
In my previous writings on this issue, some of it done in collaboration with Lucian
Bebchuk, I explored a variety of intermediate liability rules that, under some
assumptions, provide optimal incentives to invest precontractually.28 Some of these
rules place unrealistic informational burdens on courts. There is one regime,
however, that places only a modest informational burden on courts and can lead to
optimal incentives in a subset of negotiations—those in which parties reached a
preliminary understanding.
Imagine a rule that imposes liability on a party who retracts from the terms to
which it had previously agreed—any of the terms included in the preliminary
understanding.29 Sometimes the preliminary understating is formalized in a letter of
intent, making it easy to identify. Other times it may require some subtlety to
identify the set of terms that a party agreed to—the term that the party represented
to be acceptable. Once these terms are identified, a retraction would be any attempt
by the party to reopen the negotiations over these terms in order to extract a more
favorable division of the surplus, or an outright refusal to negotiate the remaining
open terms, thereby violating the plan to proceed with the negotiations. The party
who retracts would be liable for the other party's reliance expenditures—those
incurred after the preliminary understanding.

See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Omri Ben‐Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. Leg. Stud. 423
(2001); Omri Ben‐Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual
Liability, 152 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (2004); Omri Ben‐Shahar, Agreeing to Disagree: Filling Gaps in
Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 Wisc. L. Rev.
28

29 Variants of this rule were applied in several famous cases. See, e.g. Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wisc. 1965) (liability on a franchisor who retracted from terms it
previously represented); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W. 2d. 114 (Minn. 1981),
(liability on employer who revoked his employment offer, even before the offer was
accepted); Arcadian Phosphates v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F. 2d 69 (2nd Cir. 1989) (liability on
seller who changed its position as to what terms would be acceptable).
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This no‐retraction norm is recognized in a variety of negotiation contexts. In
international negotiations, for example, when a negotiating party manifests its
position, it is considered improper to “revert to a harder position from a more
conciliatory one.”30 Treaties that are negotiated article‐by‐article and partial
understandings cannot be reopened and must be preserved in the final agreement.31
Even the agreed upon terms in agreements‐to‐agree, famously unenforceable in
private law, cannot be reopened. In treaty law, “there is little doubt that parties can
enter in legally binding ‘agreements to agree’.”32 Or, to take another example, in
collective labor negotiations parties to preliminary and tentative agreements have
an obligation to further negotiate in good faith. Courts have developed heuristics to
determine what accounts for bad faith. Interestingly, it is often held that withdrawal
of tentative agreements or making regressive proposals (two forms of “retraction”),
if not reasoned by a change of circumstances, are evidence of bad faith bargaining.33
Notice that this no‐retraction rule is not equivalent to enforcing preliminary
understanding as contracts. If they were contracts, liability for retraction would
equal the expectation interest and the court would need to supplement all the
missing terms. Also, this rule is not equivalent to a rule that effectively prohibits
renegotiation of agreed‐upon terms. Under the rule considered here, a party can,
after the preliminary understanding, push to reopen its terms and insist on more
favorable terms. But this strategy is no longer free. The intermediate liability he
would face, if that strategy led to negotiation breakdown, does not block
renegotiation; it merely affects the bargaining range in the renegotiation stage by
restricting the retracting partiy’s profitable maneuvers. It thus provides more
bargaining leverage to a party that relied on the agreement.

Iklé, supra note 16, at 22‐23.
Id., at 99 (“The very fact that the parties laboriously negotiate with each other to settle
their issues point by point constitutes an implied promise that yesterday’s work will not be
destroyed tomorrow by reopening these partial agreements”.)
32 Watson, supra note 16, at 65.
33 Mead Corp. v. NLRB, 697 F.2d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1983); Oklahoma Fixture Co., 331
NLEB 1116, 1118 (2000).
30
31
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Under this rule, parties have the optimal incentive to make reliance investments at
the pre‐closing period—the time between preliminary understanding and the
closing of the formal contract. This rule succeeds in inducing efficient reliance
because it shields an investing party from the hold‐up problem. By formally
sanctioning any retraction from the preliminary understanding, the rule changes the
incentives of the parties to retract and negotiate different terms. While
renegotiation might still occur, the retracting party must restrain its claims so as to
avoid negotiation breakdown and incur liability. This party cannot extract any of the
added surplus created by the other party’s reliance. He cannot hold up the other
party and exploit the fact that reliance costs are sunk, because reliance costs are no
longer effectively sunk. Any such hold up attempt gives the other party a chance to
recoup its reliance costs by imposing retraction liability on the holding up partner.
Thus, a retracting party who has to pay reliance damages is effectively limited in its
ex post bargaining strategy and would not engage in hold up. Since the investing
party cannot be held up, its incentive to invest would be optimal.34
Can a party masquerade a retraction and circumvent the no‐retraction rule by
making unreasonable demands related to one of the missing terms? Technically, this
would not conflict with original understanding. It would have the same effect of
ending the relationship, but without incurring any precontractual liability. For
example, if the parties agreed upon an express price to be paid in several deferred
installments, a party wishing to retract can cause the deal to fail by insisting on an
unreasonable interest rate. How would the intermediate liability rule prevent such
circumvention?
In order to avoid masqueraded retractions, a court would have to determine if any
party’s demands regarding the missing negotiable terms are unreasonable. A party
would be deemed to retract when he insists on an unreasonable term, unwilling to
enter the contract even under the specification of the missing term that, within the
range that the parties could reasonably have intended, is the most favorable to him.
For a formal proof that reliance damages are sufficient to generate efficient
precontractual reliance, see Bebchuk & Ben‐Shahar, supra note 27.
34
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Rejecting such a package is as unreasonable as retracting an explicit agreement.
Essentially, then, a party entering a preliminary agreement is making a commitment
to its terms, supplemented in all the open issues with terms most favorable within
reason to him. He will not be forced to accept, or face liability for rejecting, a
contract less favorable than this package of agreed terms plus most favorable gap
fillers.
Thus, this liability rule is “intermediate” relative to full contractual liability in
several important ways. First, it kicks in only if the other party is willing concede the
open terms—a less than likely event. One can imagine that many parties to
preliminary agreements would not be willing to concede the open terms in a
manner most favorable to their counterparts. In such cases, there is no liability and
each party would be free to walk away. Second, even when the liable party is
compelled to be part of the deal, the burden involved is quite minor. It is a deal that
contains the terms he agreed to in the preliminary understanding, supplemented by
the terms most favorable to him. Finally, if, despite it being favorable to him, the
liable party refuses to accept this deal, the liability is measured by reliance
damages—only those expenditures reasonably undertaken after the agreement.
Here is a graphic way to describe what the pre‐closing liability rule does:
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only deal to which it can confidently be said that the defendant manifested her
“constructive” intent to be bound. What reasonable grounds would the enforced‐
against party have to reject such a favorable deal? Third, it allows parties to enter
preliminary agreements without the fear that they are binding themselves to
unwanted terms that some future activist court might install in the contract. Nor are
they bound to some fuzzy and unpredictable obligation to negotiate in “good faith.”
Thus, it addresses Judge Easterbrook concern that parties ought not fear that they
bargain away their privilege to disagree on the specifics. The knowledge that they
may be surrendering to a deal that is most favorable to them is not a deterrent but
rather an inducement to enter a preliminary agreement. Finally, the rule is easy to
opt out of, by stamping the preliminary agreement with any statement that would
indicate intent to remain in one of the polar outcomes. Parties can state “enforce
this” on the letter of intent, or—conversely—that it is “non‐binding.” Knowing that
otherwise liability would be intermediate means that either party might want to opt
out, that the default rule is not biased.
C. Applying the PreClosing Liability Rule to Empro v. Ball Co
Judge Easterbrook provides only a brief description of the facts in this case before
concluding that the parties never intended the letter of intent to be binding. He
emphasized that the parties left some issues open and those were not resolved,
hence they could not have intended to be bound. A crucial underlying question,
though, was not posed nor answered in Easterbrook’s decision. Why did the seller,
who was the party who initiated the negotiations in the first place, and agreed to the
terms in the letter of intent, decide to walk away from the negotiations? Was this a
true failure to reconcile the positions on the open issues, or was it an outright
retraction by the seller? Easterbrook’s decision makes sense if this were indeed a
case of dead end in the negotiations over the remaining issues. It makes less sense—
and would be in conflict with the normative grounding of the intermediate liability
regime—if this were a case of the seller’s regret and retraction.
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The correspondence between the parties in the period that followed the letter of
intent (which I pulled out from the District Court’s file35) demonstrates back and
forth negotiations primarily over one sticky issue: the nature of the security that the
buyer would give the seller. Of the $2.4 million price stated in the agreement, $1.75
million was to be paid with a 10‐year installment promissory note. The seller was
legitimately concerned about the buyer’s indebtedness, hence demanded some
security arrangement. The buyer agreed that the inventory and equipment of the
purchased company would serve as collateral. The seller demanded that in addition
the real estate of the company would be included as security. This impasse was not
resolved and the seller turned to sell to another bidder.
Had the security arrangement been an open issue, it would be right to conclude that
the failure to resolve it indicates the absence of a binding contract. For one, it is not
clear how to fill the gap to make the agreement complete. More importantly, given
the structure of this deal as a credit transaction, the credit terms are its essence. If
the parties made their initial agreement subject to resolution of this security issue,
the failure to resolve it means that there is no mutual assent, no intent to be bound.
But the security arrangement was not an open issue. It was resolved in no uncertain
terms in the letter of intent, in a manner consistent with the buyer’s position. The
letter of intent stated, in paragraph (3):
“c. Empro shall sign and deliver to Ballco a ten (10) year Installment
Promissory Note in the amount of $1,750,000 […]. Empro shall
secure said Promissory Note with the inventory and equipment of
Ballco.”
The letter of intent continues to specify the issues that need to be resolved to reach
the final agreement, including, for example, a non‐compete agreement and a
consulting arrangement with the outgoing directors of the company. But nowhere in
the agreement does it say that the security arrangement needs to be further
negotiated. This part of the agreement was resolved.

35

Case No. 88‐2480, U.S. District Court, N.D. Ill., Eastern Division (1988).
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Indeed, it was only in the subsequent negotiations that the seller made a new
demand for additional security. The seller retracted his earlier agreement as to
which assets suffice for security and reopened this issue in an attempt to extract a
more favorable term. When the buyer rejected this demand, the seller walked away.
If this is the proper account of the negotiation failure, the intermediate liability
regime I outlined above would impose some liability on the seller. Specifically, the
rule would accord the buyer an option. He would be entitled to bind the seller to a
contract consisting of all the agreed upon terms (which include the letter of intent’s
term on the security arrangement) supplemented by provisions favorable to the
seller. Thus, with respect to the issues that were specifically left open (e.g., the non‐
compete provision) and were not resolved in the subsequent negotiations, the buyer
must concede them to the seller if he wishes to bind the seller to the letter of intent.
It could well be, though, that this account overstates the degree of assent manifested
in the letter of intent. Judge Easterbrook emphasizes that a the time of signing the
letter, the seller informed the buyer that “some clarifications are needed in
Paragraph 3(c) (last sentence).” Easterbrook view this already as an indication of a
stalemate. Does “some clarifications needed” mean “nothing is agreed upon,
everything can be reopened”? Or does it merely mean “we need to iron out some
technicalities in implementing the agreement”? Indeed, some of the issues
eventually raised by the seller qualify as minor technicalities and were resolved—
who will pay accrued employee vacation, what version of the “prime lending rate”
will be used, what happens to the security if the buyer resells the company, and
more. The buyer agreed to every one of the seller’s demands over these issues. It’s
not clear, though, that revising the essence of the security arrangement is a
“clarification.”
In any event, regardless of the position the judge takes concerning issues were truly
left open, the intermediate liability rule I proposed would prescribe a result under
which the buyer can enforce a contract if he were willing to concede the seller’s
positions over the non agreed‐upon issues. If the set of open issues were narrow,
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including only the technicalities I mentioned, the option would be more valuable to
the buyer and more burdensome on the seller. If, instead, the set of open issues
were broader and included also the security provision, as Judge Easterbrook
perceived, the option would be less valuable to the buyer who would need to
concede some added issue in order to bind the seller. The more issues left open—
the “thinner” the initial agreement—the less valuable is the buyer’s option and the
lesser is the burden borne by the seller who wishes to walk away but must
surrender to the buyer’s option‐to‐enforce. In this manner, liability effectively
increases (continuously) with the measure of assent.
Notice how the intermediate liability rule reduces the stakes. The judge no longer
needs to assign an extreme and very specific meaning to the vague and casual
statement “some clarifications needed.” It no longer has to choose between “nothing
is binding,” or “we have a contract.” This langugage can mean what many parties
probably think it means: “some things—but not everything—still need to be worked
out.” All that remains for the judge to decide is which issues were closed (and thus
cannot be reopened) and which remained open. The latter, if unresolved in the
subsequent negotiations, must be conceded by the buyer to avoid a stalemate. Since
the problem was not framed this way—was the buyer willing to concede the seller’s
position on the open issues—we don’t know if the buyer would have exercised the
option, conceding the open terms, which potentially include the problematic
security term.
Unfortunately, judge Easterbrook did not partition the issues according to this
methodology. The statement “some clarifications needed,” which the seller included
in the cover letter attached to the preliminary agreement, was taken as eliminating
any kind of commitment, even to the express terms of the agreement. This is an
extreme result. It does not try to reconcile the seller’s simultaneous signing and
requesting clarifications in a way that would make both acts meaningful. Rather, it
empties the signing of the agreement of any meaningful consequence.
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The seller’s violation of the no‐retraction liability rule would lead to a recovery of
damages. Since the purpose of this liability rule is to induce optimal reliance, it
suffices to compensate the buyer for its reliance costs. Here, the buyer’s reliance
costs were non‐trivial: hiring attorneys to proceed with due diligence, making
several trips to investigate and review the company, paying for appraisals, and
participating in several negotiation meetings. These are socially desirable post‐
agreement, pre‐closing, investments and they ought to be protected by liability.
D. Conclusion: Ways of Criticizing a Judge
The analysis here suggest that judges do not need to walk the razor’s edge between
no liability and full contractual liability every time they adjudicate a pre‐closing case
in which the agreement was subject to a formal contract. Currently, the razor’s edge
methodology leads courts to seek clues about the parties’ intent in factors that are
too subtle, while recognizing that this formula is often ambiguous.36 There is
confusion whether the parties’ intent is an issue of law or fact; whether parol
evidence can be included; whether the subject to statement is a condition precedent,
and the implications of such category. It is often hard to interpret what the parties’
intent was, when they used this language. Courts tend to infer from the breakdown
of subsequent negotiations that the original agreement was not binding. Against
this, and in attempt to break down the dichotomous nature of the liability problem, I
showed that a pre‐closing agreement can be binding but not final. The No‐Retraction
principle provides one possible grounding for such mechanism, setting the
magnitude of liability on a continuum that reflects the quantum of agreement
reached by the parties.
It is not altogether fair, though, to criticize a judge—even a creative judge as
Easterbrook—for failing to apply a “new” rule, one that is not part of the accepted
jurisprudence in the area. Judge Easterbrook felt compelled to choose between two
polar outcomes. This is the standard methodology that most courts follow. He may

36

See, e.g., Interway, Inc. v. Alagna, 407 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ill. 1980).
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have made the choice seem too easy, overlooking the magnitude of assent already
reached, but the choice is still plausible.
The critique, then, is not of the specific outcome in the case. It is a critique of the line
of cases for which Empro has become a prominent representative. In a subtle and
interesting way, some courts have been breaking away from the dichotomous, all‐
or‐nothing methodology, developing heuristics for precontractual liability and for
negotiations in bad‐faith, which are consistent with the no‐retraction norm.37 Even
Easterbrook’s court has been at times innovative in this area.38 Empro v. Ball Co.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Omri Ben-Shahar
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
omri@uchicago.edu

Prominent examples include: Teacher Insurance v. Tribune, 670 F.Supp 491 (S.D.N.Y
1987) (letter of intent even obligates parties to negotiate; Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial
Industries, 248 A. 2d 625 (Del. 1968) and Copeland v. Baskin Robbins, 117 Cal.Rptr. 2d 875
(CalApp. 2 Dist., 2002) (agreement to agree obligates parties to negotiate); Hoffman v. Red
Owl Stores 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wisc. 1965) (precontractual understandings, even short of an
agreement, create reliance liability).
38 Venture Associates v. Zenith Data Systems, 96 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing various
liability measures for breach of obligation to negotiate).
37

23

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
For a listing of papers 1–399 please go to Working Papers at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html

400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.

Shyam Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives (April 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein and Reid Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups (April 2008)
M. Todd Henderson, Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz, Predicting Crime (April 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments (April 2008)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study (April
2008)
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Which States Have the Best (and Worst) High
Courts? (May 2008)
Richard H. McAdams and Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two
Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance (May 2008, revised October
2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Two Conceptions of Irreversible Environmental Harm (Mary 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, Public Use in a Post-Kelo World (June 2008)
Jonathan R. Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication (June 2008)
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Documenting Discrimination? (June 2008)
M. Todd Henderson, Alan D. Jagolinzer, and Karl A. Muller, III, Scienter Disclosure (June 2008)
Jonathan R. Nash, Taxes and the Success of Non-Tax Market-Based Environmental Regulatory
Regimes (July 2008)
Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Depoliticizing Administrative Law (June 2008)
Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud (June 2008)
Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” in Contract Law (July 2008)
Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Gap-Filling (July 2008)
Omri Ben-Shahar, How to Repair Unconscionable Contracts (July 2008)
Richard A. Epstein and David A. Hyman, Controlling the Costs of Medical Care: A Dose of
Deregulation (July 2008)
Eric A. Posner, Erga Omnes Norms, Institutionalization, and Constitutionalism in International
Law (August 2008)
Thomas J. Miles and Eric A. Posner, Which States Enter into Treaties, and Why? (August 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming (August 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold (August 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property (August 2008)
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment
(August 2008)
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights
Jurisprudence (August 2008)
Daniel Abebe and Jonathan S. Masur, International Agreements and Internal Heterogeneity: The
“Two Chinas” Problem (August 2008; updated September 2009)
William Birdthistle and M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment Desegregation in
Private Equity (August 2008)
Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks (abstract only) (September 2008)
Paul J. Heald, Testing the Over- and Under-Exploitation Hypothesis: Bestselling Musical
Compositions (1913–32) and Their Use in Cinema (1968–2007) (September 2008)
M. Todd Henderson and Richard A. Epstein, Introduction to “The Going Private Phenomenon:
Causes and Implications” (September 2008)
Paul Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model (September 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism (September 2008)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penality: The Birth of Natural Order, the Illusion of Free Markets
(September 2008)

24

434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

Bernard E. Harcourt, Abolition in the U.S.A. by 2050: On Political Capital and Ordinary Acts of
Resistance (September 2008)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Liability for Lapses: First or Second Order Negligence? (October
2008)
Ariel Porat, A Comparative Fault in Defense Contract Law (October 2008)
Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory and the Law
(October 2008)
Dhammika Dharamapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Richard H. McAdams, Belief in a Just World,
Blaming the Victim, and Hate Crime Satatutes (October 2008)
M. Todd Henderson, The Impotence of Delaware’s Taxes: A Short Response to Professor
Barzuza’s Delaware’s Compensation (October 2008)
Richard McAdams and Thomas Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics (November 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security post-9/11: An Empirical Investigation (November
2008)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the
Financial Meltdown of 2008 (November 2008)
Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability (November 2008)
Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardinas: Judicial Councils and Judicial
Independence (November 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, The Many Faces of Fault in Contract Law: Or How to Do Economics Right,
without Really Trying (December 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Zeckhauser, Overreaction to Fearsome Risks (December 2008)
Gilbert Metcalf and David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax (January 2009)
David A. Weisbach, Responsibility for Climate Change, by the Numbers (January 2009)
M. Todd Henderson, Two Visions of Corporate Law (January 2009)
Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, An Information Theory of Willful Breach (January 2009)
Tom Ginsburg, Public Choice and Constitutional Design (January 2009)
Richard Epstein, The Case against the Employee Free Choice Act (January 2009)
Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles (February 2009)
Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, and Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control after Heller: Threats and
Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective (February 2009)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon (February 2009)
M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation and the Market for Paternalism (February 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons (February 2009)
Richard A. Epstein and M. Todd Henderson, Marking to Market: Can Accounting Rules Shake the
Foundations of Capitalism? (April 2009)
Eric A. Posner and Luigi Zingales, The Housing Crisis and Bankruptcy Reform: The Prepackaged
Chapter 13 Approach (April 2009)
Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response
to the Judicial Salary Debate (April 2009)
Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants (April 2009)
Randal C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works Monopoly? (April
2009, revised July 2009)
Randal C. Picker, The Mediated Book (May 2009)
Anupam Chander, Corporate Law’s Distributive Design (June 2009)
Anupam Chander, Trade 2.0 (June 2009)
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, Inferring the Winning Party in the
Supreme Court from the Pattern of Questioning at Oral Argument (June 2009)
Eric A Posner, Kathryn Spier, and Adrian Vermeule, Divide and Conquer (June 2009)
John Bronsteen, Christopher J. Buccafucso, and Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness (June
2009)
Richard A. Epstein and Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Soveriegn Wealth Funds: The
Virtues of Going Slow (June 2009)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy (June 2009)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Alon Harel, Ken Levy, Michael M. O’Hear, and Alice Ristroph,
Randomization in Criminal Justice: A Criminal Law Conversation (June 2009)

25

472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.

Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penality: A Brief Genealogy (June 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy (June 2009)
Richard A. Epstein, How to Undermine Tax Increment Financing: The Lessons of ProLogis v.
City of Chicago (June 2009)
Randal C. Picker, Online Advertising, Identity and Privacy (June 2009)
M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance” (July 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell and Julie Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes (July 2009)
Douglas G. Baird, The Holmesian Bad Man’s First Critic (August 2009)
Douglas G. Baird, The Bankruptcy Exchange (August 2009)
Jonathan Masur and Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis (August 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell, The Unbounded Home, Property Values beyond Property Lines (August 2009)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Henry Louis Gates and Racial Profiling: What’s the Problem? (September
2009)
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Mirya Holman, and Eric A. Posner, Judging Women (September
2009)
Omri Ben-Shahar, One-Way Contracts: Consumer Protection without Law (October 2009)
Ariel Porat, Expanding Liability for Negligence Per Se (October 2009)
Ariel Porat and Alex Stein, Liability for Future Harm (October 2009)
Anup Malani and Ramanan Laxminrayan, Incentives for Surveillance of Infectious Disease
Outbreaks (October 2009)
Anup Malani, Oliver Bembom and Mark van der Laan, Accounting for Differences among
Patients in the FDA Approval Process (October 2009)
David Gilo and Ariel Porat, Viewing Unconsconability through a Market Lens (October 2009)
David Weisbach, Instrument Choice Is Instrument Design (October 2009)
M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones (November 2009)
ProCD v. Zeidenberg and Cognitive Overload in Contractual Bargaining (November 2009)
Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Innovation: Framing Baselines in the Google Book Search
Settlement (November 2009)
Richard A. Epstein, Against Permititis: Why Volunteer Organizations Should Regulate the Use of
Cancer Drugs (November 2009)
Richard A. Epstein, Heller’s Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why There Is Too Little, Not Too
Much, Private Property (November 2009)
Richard A. Epstein, NRA v. City of Chicago: Does the Second Amendment Bind Frank
Easterbrook? (November 2009)
Randal C. Picker, Easterbrook on Copyright (November 2009)
Omri Ben-Shahar, Pre-Closing Liability (November 2009)

26

